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Introduction
For a specific class of games, and when players use a precise Dirichlet model (PDM)
to learn the strategy used by their opponent, Fudenberg et al. have proved a number
of interesting convergence results; [2, 3].
We present a generalisation of this learning model that uses the imprecise Dirichlet
model (IDM); [5]. We also generalise the convergence results.
The game: two players competing against each other
We’re considering two-player games: player i has one opponent −i.
The rules are simple: each player chooses a strategy every time he plays. These
strategies then completely determine their rewards (i.e., a possibly negative pay-off).
We’re only considering strictly competitive games: if one player gets more by chan-
ging his strategy, his opponent will get less.
Two strategy types: pure and mixed
Each player has a finite set Si of pure strategies si.
He can also use a mixed strategy σ i ∈ Σi, which is a probability mass function over
the set of pure strategies, and let his pure strategy be randomly chosen accordingly.
Strategies can be represented on a unit simplex, where pure strategies correspond
to the vertices and convex combinations of vertices correspond to mixed strategies.
The simplex Σi of player i,
with Si = {1,2,3}
and σ i = (15,
3
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1
5).
  
 
1 2
3
σ i
What pay-off to expect
After every game, both players receive a pay-off Xsi(s−i) which is completely deter-
mined by the played strategies.
When mixed strategies are played, we can only calculate an expected pay-off
Xσ i(σ−i) = ∑
si∈Si
∑
s−i∈S−i
Xsi(s−i)σ i(si)σ−i(s−i).
The uncertainty about the opponent’s strategy
Each player supposes that his opponent plays a fixed mixed strategy (fictitious play ).
An IDM describes the uncertainty about the opponent’s strategy
The player uses a set of Dirichlet distributions on the simplex Σ−i as the basis for
probabilistic statements that relate to his opponent’s unknown fixed strategy choice.
An IDM is the lower prevision P(· | β,M) determined by these distributions.
This set of distributions is parameterised by a number of (pseudo)counts β and a
subset M ⊆ int(Σ−i). Every strategy in M corresponds to the expectation value of
the fixed strategy under one distribution.
Updating the IDM after playing a game
After observing the pure strategy played by the opponent, the set of distributions is
updated using Bayes’ rule, which, here, comes down to moving and shrinking M.
Initially, when the player hasn’t a clue about his opponent’s strategy, he can use
M0 = int(Σ−i). The corresponding IDM is a vacuous prevision.
The simplex Σ−i of the opponent,
with S−i = {1,2,3}.
Updating after observing s−i = 3
in game t.
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The player chooses his own strategy, if he can. . .
On the basis of the information at his disposal, the player will want to choose an opti-
mal strategy . Optimal in the sense that it maximises his immediate expected pay-off
and possibly minimises his risk. In general, the player will find sets of not always
comparable optimal strategies. Out of these he can only make an arbitrary choice.
Best replies and maximin strategies
There are two types of optimal strategy choices when a player is sure that his oppo-
nent will choose a strategy in a subset M ⊆ Σ−i.
Best replies BRi(M) are all the player’s strategies σ i that maximise his expected
pay-off Xσ i(σ−i) for a strategy σ−i ∈ M.
M-maximin-strategies are those strategies τ i that maximise his minimal expected
pay-off, i.e., for which
τ i ∈ argmax
σ i∈Σi
inf
σ−i∈M
Xσ i(σ−i).
A player’s optimal strategies under uncertainty
When an IDM P(· | β,M) describes the information available about the opponent’s
fixed strategy (now, we are only sure of the fact that this strategy lies on Σ−i), there
are two analogous types of optimal strategies as seen above; [4, §3.9].
Maximal strategies are those strategies σ i for which
min
τ i∈Σi
P(Xσ i −Xτ i | β,M)≥ 0,
where P(· | β,M) is the conjugate upper prevision of P(· | β,M). We have found that
maximal strategies are best replies BRi(co(M)) to the closed convex hull of M.
A P(· | β,M)-maximin strategy is a strategy σ i that maximises P(Xσ i | β,M). We
have found that P(· | β,M)-maximin strategies are co(M)-maximin strategies.
What can happen if the game is repeatedly played
A strategy profile σ is a couple of strategies (σ i,σ−i) of the player and his opponent.
An equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile for which σ∗ ∈ BR(σ∗), each component is a
best reply to the other; [1]. For a strict equilibrium s∗, it holds that s∗ = BR(s∗).
When the played strategy profile converges, it is to an equilibrium
We have proved that if players use an IDM as described above (or a PDM, which is
an IDM with M a singleton), it holds that:
• If a strict equilibrium s∗ must be played once, it will always be played subsequently.
• If in an infinite sequence of games a strategy profile s∗ is played from a certain
game onward, it is an equilibrium.
• If in an infinite sequence of games the frequencies of played pure strategies con-
verges to a strategy profile σ∗, then this is an equilibrium.
Conclusion
We have successfully generalised a game-theoretic learning model that uses a PDM
to one that uses an IDM. Its main advantages are the possibility of representing initial
or intermediary ignorance. A disadvantage is its increased complexity.
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